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Abstract

This paper questions the economic perspective of institutions and its uncritical approach to using local organisations and leaders. It argues that the instrumental approach of socially-embedded institutions for enhancing project efficiency and political legitimacy disregards the existing unequal structures of authority within communities. Drawing from Bourdieu’s notion of ‘symbolic power’, I argue that local elites make use of collective rituals and cultural symbols to legitimatise their rule. Reinvention of traditions also places the poor at a disadvantage because they lack sufficient knowledge to draw upon ‘community wisdom’ to make claims and counter-claims. The romanticisation of socially-embedded institutions also plays down the dark side. A high level of trust can reduce transparency, making nepotism possible. The livelihoods of the poor, being built upon these exploitative relationships, also hinder them from challenging the inequalities. 
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Partner or Pariah? Building social capital with clan associations in Hong Kong. 


1 Introduction 

Social capital theory, largely based on the economic approach of institutions, considers it necessary to restructure individual incentives, redefine social relations with rules and roles, and reshape the local structure of authority, to enforce collective action. Authority is regarded as being of great importance since it ensures cooperation, evokes trust, encourages compliance and punishes free-riding. 
There is a rising recognition of the role of local and informal institutions, such as social norms, cultural practices and traditions, in the designs of institutional arrangements and authority building. The World Bank (e.g. 2002, 2003) and IFAD (2001) suggest building social capital based on local organisations and maintaining close partnership with local elites in order to increase project efficiency and social legitimacy. 
Critics, however, have raised concerns about the utilitarian approach and the uncritical cooperation of local organisations and community leaders. They suggest that traditions and local customs are not politically neutral. They can become the local elites’ instruments in justifying their legitimacy (Williams, et al. 2003). Without a deeper understanding of the local politics and internal power structures within local organisations, interventions only reinforce the existing inequalities (Beall, 2001). Rising participation of the poor may not necessarily improve their well-being. 
This debate is relevant in the context of Hong Kong. After the Handover in 1997, it has witnessed closer relationships between clan associations and the government. The Chiu Chow Cultural Festival in 2000-1 is an example. Clan associations are encouraged to apply for the Community Investment and Inclusion Fund to build social capital for their communities. While the role of clan associations in community building becomes more significant, we need to examine how it may affect the livelihoods of the poor, and whether social capital generated by clan associations will be evenly distributed amongst community members. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: firstly, I shall examine the social capital theory and point out the role of informal institutions in authority building. Then, the situation of clan associations in Hong Kong, especially after the Handover, is briefly discussed. In the third section, the political nature of rules and roles is examined in order to investigate whether the poor are able to negotiate rule implementation in their communities. Then, drawing upon Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of ‘symbolic power’, I shall examine how local elites make use of collective rituals and cultural symbols to legitimatise their rules. Despite the constant reinvention of traditions, I shall argue in the next section why the poor, especially new Chinese arrivals, are unable to make claims and counter-claims about traditions. Lastly, I shall mention the dark side of socially-embedded institutions and discuss how the poor produce and reinforce existing social inequalities. 

2 Institutions and social capital model 
Neo-institutionalists discuss social capital within the collective action framework. This approach, led by Ostrom, Uphoff and the World Bank, argues that collective action can occur and be sustained in the right circumstances and ‘right’ institutional arrangements. They highlight the role of social capital in their model, arguing that spontaneous cooperation is made possible by the presence of social capital, since trust, norms and networks generate expectations, facilitate coordinated actions and punish non-compliance (Ostrom & Ahn, 2003, Woolcock, 1998). 
The success in overcoming dilemmas of collective action, they argue, depends on a broader social context. They take social norms seriously, emphasising that: ‘norms were as important as formal rules in explaining how individuals cope with a diversity of collective-action problems’ (Ostrom & Ahn, 2003:xxvi). In other words, they modify the modelling of incentive by combining ‘rational choice clarity with more socially informed complexity’ (Cleaver, 1996). 
In addition, they question the neo-classical institutional economists’ assumption that efficient institutions arise naturally to respond to any transaction cost or information asymmetry (Fafchamps, 2004, my emphasis). They suggest that, because of imperfect information and high transaction costs, individuals are unable entirely to predict future outcomes and their rationality is ‘bounded’ by the availability of information and the ability to proceed it (Ingram & Clay, 2000).

2.1 Ostrom’s collective action model 

This model (Figure1) is an attempt to clarify the confusing concept of social capital, in particular the causal relationships between trust, networks and institutions. It suggests a clear linear relationship: trustworthiness, networks and institutions are the three forms of social capital which generate trust. Trust is the key element in facilitating collective action. 
Ostrom and Ahn place emphasis on the significance of trust in underpinning economic and social relations, because trust plays a critical role in facilitating transactions and enforcing contracts. Trust is a self-reinforcing mechanism: the success of a transaction will make future transactions possible. Building dense networks for the poor by high membership and civic engagement helps to reduce transaction costs by transmitting information to members about who are trustworthy and who are not. 

2.2 Local organisations and authority 
Among the three forms of social capital, institutions are regarded as the most important elements because they ‘cause for the success and failure of collective action’, but they are ‘frequently not included in the popular definition of social capital’ (Ostrom & Ahn, 2003:xxx). The core proposition is that cooperation is shaped by incentives, and incentives are largely provided by institutions. Institutions, together with networks and trustworthiness, are intended to alter the incentive structure of the trustees. The repetitive nature of interaction among individuals provides incentives for individuals to build a reputation for being trustworthy, then formulate mutual expectations of cooperative behaviour (Ostrom, 1995). 
To be fair, formal and informal institutions are both considered in the model, but the inclusion of informal institutions is largely based on instrumental consideration: informal institutions are sometimes more efficient at achieving the objectives and they embody features that formal institutions are unable to provide (World Bank, 2002). 
Institutional scholars argue that building authority is necessary if public goods are to be supplied efficiently. Authority is considered necessary to ensure cooperation, to evoke trust and to punish free-riding (e.g. Kaul, et al. 2003). Selecting local leaders, setting up new arbitration bodies and building on existing social organisations help to create the general patterns of authority. Authority also relies on the use of rules and roles. Institutional scholars believe that explicit rules are needed because they ‘make people explicitly aware of the expectations that are supposed to govern their behaviour’ (Uphoff, 2000:11). Rules become effective only when they are discussed and are mutually agreed, and roles are clearly defined. 
Authority is backed up by the use of sanctions. The exercise of a sanction for non-cooperation affects ‘a trustor’s assessment of the trustee’s future behaviour’ which is regarded as a means of weakening rent-seeking individuals and lowering free-riding incentives (Ostrom & Ahn, 2003:xviii). However, sanctions, they argue, are not always used in reality because informal rules provide ‘the key ingredients of the compliance-friendly regime’ (Ahsan, 2003:55). 
The neo-institutional perspective runs parallel with the currently popular discourse of bottom-up, community-based participation. Public goods are assumed to be more effectively and equitably managed by ‘the people’, and structural obstacles are challenged by wide participation. Local self-governing is considered to be more sustainable because community members involved in the processes of rule negotiation and interpretation can develop a workable and agreed set of rules. 
This approach marks the triumph of ‘community’ which is now highly regarded as an alternative to the state and market. A basic underlying unity in ‘community’ is assumed, but diversity of interests is recognised and solved by negotiation. In addition, indigenous knowledge is emphasised, and traditional and modern forms of organisations are held to be equally capable of facilitating collective action. 

3 Clan associations in Hong Kong 
Hong Kong has witnessed a considerable growth of clan associations, especially since the Open Door Policy of China in 1978. Refer to Table 1; the numbers of clan associations have increased by nearly 65% since the 1970s. The growth is largely due to political and economic changes both within Hong Kong and in China. 
Especially after the Handover in 1997, the relationships between local community leaders (most often overlapping with clan association leaders) and the Government became closer (Choi, 2001). A good example is the Chiu Chow Cultural Festival in 2000-1, jointly organised by the Government and Chiu Chow clan associations. It is regarded as a mutually beneficial projec; while the clan associations can take this opportunity to modernise their image and receive public funding, the government uses it to foster tourism. 
Apart from the consideration of political absorption, the Government believes that local and traditional organisations can play a more significant role in local community development and building. In the 2001 policy address, the Chief Executive declared the setting up of a HK$300 million ‘Community Investment and Inclusion Fund’ (CIIF). It aims to:
‘promote community participation, mutual assistance, support and social inclusion provided through strengthened community network in the community. This will in turn help reinforce the sense of belonging in the community, enhance the social networks of individuals and families, broaden the support base available to assist them to resolve their problems and address common concerns. These community networks, strengthened relations, sense of belonging, and willingness to provide mutual aid form the foundation of social capital’ (Health, Welfare and Food Bureau, 2002:4)

Apart from fostering bridging social capital by encouraging and facilitating cooperation between organisations of different natures, it also hopes to encourage ‘bottom-up solutions that seek to promote the development of social capital’ (p5, my emphasis). 
The Government sent details and applications of CIIF to various local organisations, including clan associations. Leaders are encouraged to participate in social capital seminars in order to have a better understanding of the rationale of the Fund. This research was conducted, before the Government announced the result of successful applicants, but in my personal interviews, community leaders expressed their keen interest in the Fund, believing that the funding from the Government can strengthen their role in serving communities. 

3.1 Research methodology
While local organisations, especially clan associations, play a more significant role in community building, my deep concern is whether social capital generated by them is evenly distribution among community members. I am also aware that, as more and more organisations mobilise the poor to make connections, it may have a negative impact on their livelihoods and exert an extra burden on their already-limited resources and time. 
This paper is largely based on my 12-month ethnographic research in Hong Kong for my PhD in 2001-2. I approached clan associations randomly and discussed my research objectives with the leaders. In order to increase the chance of success and contact community members, I proposed to run free English classes for their organisations. After a long period of negotiations, three clan associations finally accepted my offer. They include: a city-based Fujian clan association in North Point, a city-based Yunnan clan association in Causeway, and a service-oriented Chiu Chow clan association in Sheung Wan. They allowed me to sit in at their monthly board meetings, read their members’ details and attend their annual banquets. The English class permited me to contact members of clan associations, as well as non-members, because some of these classes are open to public. 
By a snowball sampling method, I successfully approached two other village-based Fujian clan associations, both in North Point. This gave me an opportunity to have a closer examination of their close networks and social ties. The interactions between village-based and province-based clan associations also expose the power dynamics between them.  
All in all, this research is primarily qualitative in nature. Data collection is based on participant observation, interviews and secondary documents, such as newsletters of clan associations. My objectives are to explore the internal structures of clan associations, examine how decisions are made and how cultural rituals are demonstrated, and investigate the perceptions, behaviour and the processes involving community members within clan associations and in communities.

4 Political nature of new rules and roles
The institutional approach of social capital regards social roles, rules and sanctions as the basis of the normative regulation of individuals and collective actions. Lopez and Scott (2000:29) describe: ‘The key mechanism of institutional regulations has been developed through the concepts of social positions and role expectations …… social institutions regulate actions by defining the social positions that people can occupy and the behaviour that is associated with these positions’. In order to get the institutions right, institutional theorists are accused of focusing on the ‘narrowest of technical senses’ to overcome contractual or information problems. 
This perspective, however, does not suffice to explore the political dimension of rules and roles (Field, 2003). Questions, such as who set roles, who use sanctions, and who make claims, need to be asked, because institutional designs are not simply technical issues, but involve the distribution of power. As highlighted in IFAD 2001 report, institutions ‘intermediate between the competing demands of different social groups. Inevitably, those who control institutions, usually the better-off, gain most in this process’ (vi-vii). In this section, I challenge the apolitical design of rules and roles, arguing that powerful social groups in communities may take advantage of new bureaucratic institutions at the expense of the poor. 

4.1 Who actually benefit from newly-crafted institutions? 
New rules may bring changes, but they do not necessarily make the institutional arrangements more egalitarian. Clan associations in Hong Kong have been severely criticised for being ‘traditional and bureaucratic’ over the past few years, especially in distributing welfare benefits amongst members. Senior and wealthy members are accused of securing more benefits. To improve their images in communities, leaders have carried out a series of reforms to make their organisations more transparent and democratic. For example, they introduced the ‘first come, first served’ principle which is regarded as fair and unbiased. The poor, however, do not benefit from the implementation of this new rule. In interviews, members of clan associations tell me that they remain excluded from benefits. Since most senior and wealthy members are committee members, they control most updated information, so that their families make reservations much earlier than the ordinary members. This example supports the argument put forward by Lawson. He argues that: ‘Rules as resources are not equally available, or do not apply equally, to each member of the population at large’ (1997, 97-8). Institutional reforms do not guarantee a more even distribution of resources, and worse still, they allow the privileged to further pursue their interests. 
Sanctions play a key role in the institutional designs because they punish free-riders, increase the cost of deviant behaviour, and finally make contractual relations more equal. These instrumental and technical views of sanctions, however, obscure two crucial political agendas: who has the right to impose sanction, and what political motivations are behind this. Lopez and Scott (2000) warn that: ‘A powerful social group may be able to impose its preferences on the less powerful by using its power to sanction non-conformity. In these circumstances, the institutions of a society will express the values of the powerful - who may not even form a majority’ (33). The privileged who own the power of sanction then exercise authority to define and govern what are admissible behaviours. They can also make claims and scrap ‘unwanted’ agenda items. For instance, a middle-ranking committee member wants to initiate a debate about the role of migrants in a committee meeting of his clan association. He believes that the association faces a problem with ageing, and it needs new blood urgently. He suggests recruiting more new arrivals from the Mainland because they retain a strong passion towards their hometowns. However, the prevalence of anti-migrant sentiment prevents it from becoming an item for discussion on the agenda of the meeting. 
To conclude, newly-crafted bureaucratic institutions are not apolitical. New rules are both authorised and legitimated, and may allow the rich, the powerful and the educated to represent and articulate the needs of the disadvantaged. Sanction-in-rule may also help to reinforce normative control (McGhee, 2003). Therefore, it is possible that ‘inequitable norms are negotiated, reproduced, reinforced, through which authority is exercised and sanctions imposed’ (Cleaver, 2004, forthcoming). How individuals respond to the inequality of power will be discussed later in the section on agency.

5 Structure of socially-embedded authority 
Increasing numbers of institutionalists are aware of the impact of socially-embedded institutions, and some of them advocate incorporating the existing social organisations into institutional designs. They suggest working with socially-embedded principles and drawing upon traditions and cultural values in order to increase social legitimacy of projects. For example, Ostrom and Ahn (2003) suggest using ‘the networks that participants have created, and the norms that they have adopted’ because the types of rules that individuals will find protective depends upon ‘the kinds of norms and patterns of reciprocity that already exist’ (p.xxiii).
Since collective action agreements need to be backed up by credible enforcement mechanisms, more institutional arrangements are built upon existing structures of authority and assigned a major role for local elites who can exercise ‘authority’. Mansuri and Rao (2003) suggest there is a general understanding in the school of institutional crafting that: 

‘…… elites are likely to have strong interests in the common pool resources, they have strong incentives to protect them and elite capture need not be a problem if such elite organisations deal only with non-privatisable benefits’ (p.23, my emphasis)

However, whether this is based on evidence or merely on assumptions is debatable.  
The trend of using existing social organisations needs treating with great caution. We need to explore the enthusiasts’ motives and their understanding of socially-embedded institutions. Critics argue that this approach adopts a utilitarian view of socially-embedded institutions which believes that the inclusion of the existing organisations increases social legitimacy, improves project efficiency, economises on transaction costs, and secures effective social cooperation (Cleaver, 2002). For example, in the World Development Report 2002, building bridges between existing formal and informal institutions is regarded as ‘an effective means of enhancing the success of formal institutions’ (178). In World Development Report 2003, socially-embedded institutions are considered since ‘markets need the support of other institutions to ensure the right incentives’ (38-9). All these examples demonstrate a conscious process by which existing social and cultural arrangements are drawn upon to shape collective action. However, this fails to recognise the depth of social and cultural embeddedness of decision-making and cooperation relations.  
Whether it reduces transaction costs is also questionable, because consensus ruling and cultural norms of reconciliation make quick-fix solutions difficult. In addition, without a deeper understanding of the structure of customary authority, it carries the risk of reinforcing the existing social inequalities and divisions rather than challenging them. 
In this section, I shall use Pierre Bourdieu’s ‘symbolic power’ (1977) to examine how community leaders deploy traditions, rituals and social symbols to neutralise their rule, which leaves their legitimacy unquestioned. Then, I shall move on to explore a deeper meaning of tradition, arguing that the distinctions between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ become unclear. The reinvention of tradition and ‘community wisdom’ may limit the negotiations to some particular groups of community members. 

5.1 Symbolic power 
Bourdieu (1977) suggests that ruling classes strengthen their control by manipulating rituals, traditions and cultural symbols to neutralise their legitimacy. Use of culturally-embedded practices, he argues, helps to develop a sense of collectivity, so that orders and solidarity are reasserted. In his words, ‘the naturalisation of the ideological and practical effects of the mechanisms assure[s] the reproduction of the relations of domination and control’ (1977:196). Institutions become the instruments of the powerful to maintain authority because individuals are totally ‘unaware of the very question of legitimacy’ (168). In his model of ‘symbolic mode of dominance’, he highlights three key features: firstly, the emphasis of the social calendar and rhythms is intended to create a collective sense of time and place. Secondly, the ritualisation of collective practice legitimises unity and reasserts solidarity. Thirdly, language, dialect, music and other cultural symbols turn out to be ‘institutionalised instruments for maintenance of the symbolic order’ (165). 
His analysis is particularly useful in exploring complex power relationships in ‘communities’. While socially and culturally-embedded institutions enable some groups to exercise power, they can constrain others. In my research, collective rituals play a very important role in clan associations. Referring to the newsletters of clan associations, I have recorded their annual events.
Festivals, banquets and celebrations in clan associations, binding members together, are summarised in Table 2. During these formal gatherings, cultural symbols, such as traditional music, dancing, home-town food and red packets, are drawn upon in order to develop a sense of nostalgia and reinforce collective identities. In Bourdiue’s argument, these social events provide a ‘social calendar’ which governs the behaviour of members regarding what to do and when to do it. Respect for collective rhythms, he argues, implies ‘respect for the rhythm that is appropriate to each action’ (1977:162).
Ritual symbols are presented in an informal and religious way. For example, the central committee of Ku Ying village-based clan association has brought a Buddha statue from the hometown and placed it at the entrance of their association to create a collective belief (see photo 1). While speaking dialects fosters the sense of ‘home’, regular cross-border exchanges to worship ancestors remind members of their roots. In Berry’s observation (1993), collective activities, such as funerals, marriages and initiation rites, create golden opportunities for the powerful and the rich to gain respect and create obligations among their kin and neighbours by offering donations and contributing food and gifts. 

5.2 Building on differences 
While rituals and religious status help to create the sense of commonality, other symbols, such as cosmetics, clothing, decorations and ornaments are deliberately deployed by the ruling class to reinforce their social differences from ordinary members. For instance, leaders’ wives wear gold necklaces and expensive evening dress to attend social events. Highlighting donations in clan associations also implies that, if ordinary members cannot help the groups financially, they should contribute their physical labour. Using role models is also a strategy to build collective identities by idolising a few distinguished members. In the case of Chiu Chow clan association, for example, Li Ka Shing, the billionaire in Hong Kong, is often cited to glorify social virtues: working hard for clan associations will finally pay off. The strategy of ‘building on differences’ is also effective in building solidarity.
Leaders in clan associations tend to make comparisons between their own associations and others. On the surface, they try to demonstrate their humbleness, but in a deeper sense, I argue, they make appeals and seek further solidarity within their associations by reminding their members of how ‘inferior’ their groups are. In other words, the leaders hint that, if they do not want to be inferior, they need to stick together. This call for solidarity, by highlighting the negative side of their groups, is in considerable contrast to NGOs’ general practice. Empowerment programmes, for example, highlight the positive, rather than the negative, image of groups. 
Nevertheless, I am aware of the limitations of Bourdieu’s analysis of dominance. Field (2003), for example, mentions that Bourdieu tends to regard ‘the powerful group’ as a homogeneous entity. This fails to address adequately the complexity of authority and diverse locations of decision-making. The role of agency in his analysis is also interesting. Take the agency of the ‘ruling class’ as an example. From Bourdieu’s perspective, the powerful are calculating, and they manipulate rituals to reproduce the relations of domination and control. I do not deny that some leaders are motivated by strategic considerations: I argue for a more complex picture of rationality. In interviews, I asked the leaders why they preserve traditions. They suggested that they have been practising them for a long time, and the elderly may feel very annoyed if they stopped doing so. They also admit that they would be regarded as ‘bad’ leaders if they do not keep to the old routines. This illustrates that decision-making processes are largely socially-embedded. While the sense of ‘keeping the status quo’ is very strong, they do not calculate using symbols to reinforce collective identities all the time. 

5.3 Reinvention of traditions
Another limitation of Bourdieu’s perspective is his inadequate analysis of tradition. Cleaver (2002) argues that individuals may accept and challenge traditions at the same time. In a case study, a young Chinese migrant strongly criticises the practices of her own clan association. She complains that leaders and senior members expect ordinary members to show respect when addressing them. She is also critical about the unfair policy of welfare distribution within the group. Most benefits, she believes, are received by senior members, rather than junior ones. Despite deep dissatisfaction, she continues to participate in the women group of her association, worshiping the Buddha statues, and encouraging her husband to keep his connections with influential senior members. This shows that the use of traditions can be flexible and dynamic in nature. 
The distinction between discourses of ‘tradition’ and ‘modern’ becomes blurred, and ‘traditions’ are constantly invented and reinvented. Owing to the change of circumstances, traditional arrangements are adjusted to suit new purposes. For example, the ‘Chiu Chow Cultural Festival’ was jointly organised by the government and Chiu Chow clan associations in the millennium. It is regarded as a mutually beneficial project; while the clan associations can take this opportunity to modernise their image and receive public funding, the government uses it to foster tourism. Both traditional and modern forms of interaction were drawn upon. Traditional dancing and Chinese Opera, along with Karaoke and a fun fair, were presented. 
Not every individual or group, however, is equally capable of reinventing traditions, and this may place migrants at a disadvantage. Old residents are more capable of drawing upon ‘community wisdom’ to make claims, but new arrivals from the Mainland China lack sufficient knowledge to make counter claims. In the account of the severe drought in Hong Kong in the early 1970s, the elderly, in interviews, highlight the strong community spirit, suggesting that members queued up cooperatively to fetch water, and helped one another. They blame new migrants for being selfish and seeking social benefits without making any contributions to the society. New arrivals do not know sufficient about the past of the ‘community’, so that they find it difficult to defend their position. 
The process of modernising traditions may easily trigger off disagreement and power struggles because not everyone agrees with the pace and direction of change, and some want to preserve traditions and avoid any change. In a general meeting, for example, a young leader proposed setting up a website for the clan association to increase transparency, but this suggestion was strongly rejected by the elders, and he was blamed for being too ‘Western’. The open rejection and public humiliation, I argue, are intended to deter other young leaders from being ‘radical’. Unwanted agenda are suppressed and are put aside in the debate (McGhee, 2003). 

5.4 Norms of wide consultation and conflict avoidance 
Despite the rapid transformation of Hong Kong society, the principle of consensus seeking remains strong in clan associations. Wide and slow consultation still prevails. For instance, small and village-based clan associations are invited to send representatives to attend monthly general meetings of province- and city-based clan associations. Apart from face-to-face negotiation, consultation by telephone is conducted before meetings in order to avoid confrontation and embarrassment. Members of staff are also consulted before new plans are implemented. If consensus cannot be reached, leaders tend to postpone the discussion to allow more time and space to negotiate. Despite long decision-making process, it proves effective in reducing conflict. 
Majority voting and sanctions are generally regarded as undesirable because they officialise the existence of disagreement. Since most clan association leaders are themselves business partners, and familes know one another very well, dense webs of networks blur the distinction between their private and public lives. As Platteau and Abraham (2002) argue, ‘any disagreement among the elite about a rule or a decision is bound to spill over into the sphere of private relations’ (112). The tight intertwining of the private and social spheres means that ‘any open manifestation of disagreement at the level of community affairs creates a negative externality on the level of interpersonal relations’ (118) 
Strong norms of reconciliation shape interpersonal relations not only amongst leaders, but also amongst ordinary members. Community leaders and the elders are keen to arbitrate and settle domestic disputes, especially family violence and divorce. They see their interventions as a way to restore already-shaken Confucian family values in Hong Kong. Their mediation works on a gender line: female leaders talk to wives who propose divorce and males talk to husbands. However, the reconciliations are not always effective since some couples insist on taking their cases to court. 
The processes of institutional evolution, therefore, are complex and fluid. Changes are made according to circumstances and needs. They do not necessarily guarantee more efficient workings because long consultation processes take time; or more optimal because ‘…… maintaining social consensus and solidarity may be equally as important as optimum resource management outcomes’ (Cleaver, 2002:17). It is also essential to mention that the poor are not necessarily better off because of consensus ruling. The lengthy community meetings and long process of renegotiating norms exert a considerable burden on the poorest people who are generally time- and resource-poor. They are excluded from the process of decision-making because they simply cannot afford to participate. 

6 Dark side of socially-embedded principles
While more regularised institutions are not necessarily empowering and fair, some of the socially-embedded ones can be corruptive and exclusive in nature. In this part, relations of trust, paradoxes of inclusion and exclusion, and the suppressive nature of collective identities are discussed. 

6.1 Higher trust = lower transparency
Building relations of trust is a key element in contractual designs, and there is a general belief that a high level of trust is necessarily good. Critics, however, caution that trust, as a socially-embedded value, may conceal power inequalities. Wintrobe, for example, suggests that: ‘the ‘elites’ of ethnic groupings will find it in their interest to ‘exploit’ ethnic loyalty …… to alter the distribution of tangible assets’ (1995:xii-xiii, my emphasis). Community leaders, in my case studies, always remind members that everyone in the community is as close as family members, and that they, being leaders, are only volunteers who want to make the ‘family’ better. This gives an impression that they work for the community out of altruism, and that members should appreciate their efforts and forgive their mistakes. It gives some people an opportunity to exploit this ‘blind faith’ for their own interests. As Berry says, customary claims can be used to ‘mask individual accumulation’ (1993:120). For instance, being the deputy chairperson of a clan association, a retail businessman sells hometown moon-cakes to his members. A member of staff one day finds out that he deliberately sets the food at higher price to make profit. She complains to the chairman but he ignores her complaint and warns her not to make any nuisance. She is not sure whether the chairman is also involved with ‘the dirty business’, but she dares not mention it again, fearing to lose her job. This case illustrates that a high level of trust means lower transparency, and mutual supervision is undermined making corruption possible. 

6.2 Inclusion = exclusion
Collective identities can easily conceal the use of power, because they ‘tend to promote conformism, to discourage disagreement or debate and to mask divisions within the groups’ (Ferguson, 2003:82). Clan associations emphasise consensus-building and delivering the image of solidarity to the public. This tendency may easily lead to suppressing of differences and alternate voices. 
In other cases, re-positioning of clan associations may generate unexpected consequences of exclusion. Should clan associations be open to mah-jong is a good example. Leaders of clan associations want to include more of the elderly by allowing them to play mah-jong in clan associations. However, female and young members are excluded from the process. The female group then dare not bring their children to clan associations because they are worried that their children will learn to gamble. The increasing number of the elderly also reinforces the image of clan associations as ‘old men’s clubs’ which puts off the young ones.  How to include one group without excluding others is not easy to resolve. 

7 Agency and livelihoods
The difficulty in tackling exploitation and exclusion, social activists claim, lies in the unconsciousness of the poor which allows processes of inequality to be produced, and reproduced, routinely.  Bourdieu’s notion of ‘symbolic power’ suggests that local elites manipulate cultural symbols and ritualisation of practices as ‘institutionalised instruments’ to legitimise their rules. As a result, the subordinated do not notice the power inequalities and they ‘help’ to reproduce the symbolic mode of domination (Bourdieu, 1977:196).
Cleaver’s notion of ‘social embeddedness of agency’ is useful here. It suggests that individuals’ behaviours are guided by common sense, routines and moral reasonings to organise things (2004, forthcoming). The reverence given to community leaders and the elders, norms of conflict avoidance and rules of consensus building, for example, shape the ‘desirable way of living’. As a result, inequalities are produced and reproduced routinely without being challenged. 
Challenging domination is not cost-free. It exerts extra pressure on the already limited time and resources of the poor. Their livelihoods are deeply embedded in social relations. It means that the access to resources is linked to their social reputations. Once they are labelled as ‘trouble-makers’, they will be blacklisted, and face great difficulty in finding jobs. In the case in construction work in Hong Kong ‘word of mouth’ and relations with foremen are paramount in securing jobs. 
IFAD report (2001) pinpoints a cruel reality that: ‘collective action was possible because of existing patron-client relationship’ (198). In interviews, migrants reiterate that, if they lose their jobs, not only they, but also their children and their relations in the Mainland will be starved. As a result, they tend to secure stable livelihoods rather than pursue equality. It is the reason why the member of staff in the clan association, whom I mentioned in the previous section, did not report the case of profiteering to the authority. Williams (et al. 2003) therefore argues that the real problem which the poor are encountering is not the problem of consciousness, but ‘finding ways of making a living within existing unequal economic and political relationships’ (177). 
Institutions are highly inter-related; change in one institution, without change in the others, does little to impact on the overall structure of authority. The poor are also trapped in the dilemma.  The interdependence of institutions exists alongside structural inequalities. How to adopt a holistic approach of institutional improvement, while at the same time tackling institutional inequalities, needs further exploration. 

8 Conclusions 
I have illustrated that institutional designs built upon the existing social organisations may not necessarily generate anticipated (and desirable) outcomes. While some socially-embedded principles and values, such as relations of trust, may reduce transparency and conceal power inequalities, others are exclusive in nature and prevent individuals from exercising power. Bourdieu’s analysis of ‘symbolic power’ also cautions us that the poor are worse off, rather than better off, from visible cooperation in communities. It is because a high level of cooperation may be a consequence of ritual and symbol manipulation by community leaders, which leaves individuals unaware of their being exploited and repressed. In addition, daily practices are historically and socially enmeshed. The reinvention of traditions and the use of community wisdom only place migrants at a disadvantage because they lack sufficient knowledge about ‘traditions’ to make (counter) claims.
I have criticised much of the new institutionalist literature for neglecting the complexity of authority in the emergence and development of institutions. While authority is considered significant in ensuring cooperation, evoking trust, encouraging compliance and tackling free-riding, it can be developed under unequal conditions. Two key and interrelated issues have not been adequately addressed: firstly, how individuals respond and adapt to the change of authority structure, and secondly, whether the design of the authority structure has taken into account cultural practices, social traditions, personal networks and the perceived ‘right way of doing things’. 
While it has become clear that social capital ‘does very little to challenge the status quo and to direct attention to the systemic sources of power corresponding disadvantage’ (Field, 2003:198), there is a need for greater emphasis on a deeper analysis of power within the institutional framework, especially exploring the mechanisms by which inequalities are routinely produced and reproduced. The school of institutional crafting fails to address adequately the power dynamics in their institutional designs because of its instrumental use of institutions. It risks reinforcing the existing social inequalities because institutions may provide local elites with enhanced power and normative authority by taking advantages in the name of custom.
I suggest, therefore, that we need to examine the interplay between bureaucratic and socially-embedded institutions, the relationship between agency and livelihoods, and how normative aspects of social structures impede agency. We also need to explore the political and historical processes and context of institutional building, examine the power relationships within ‘communities’ and investigate who represent and articulate the needs of the poor. In doing so, we can avoid ‘double victimisation’ of the poor through modern, as well as customary, institutional arrangements.
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Figure 1: Social capital and the second generation collective-action model 


	










	    (source: Ostrom & Ahn, 2003:xvii)

	   
(source: Ostrom & Ahn, 2003:xvii)




Table 1: The total numbers of clan associations in Hong Kong and their origin 

Years 	Guangdong 	Fujian 	Other provinces	Total 	Cumulative total 
Up to 1910	9	-	-	9	9
1911-1920	15	-	-	15	24
1921-1930	9	-	-	9	33
1931-1940	6	3	-	9	42
1945-1949	18	2	-	20	62
1950-1960	25	2	-	27	89
1961-1970	37	1	4	42	131
1971-1978	26	-	5	31	162
1979-1990	31	12	11	54	216
 (source: Sinn, Elizabeth, 1998:282)  




Table 2: Collective events and features in clan associations 

Events	Time	Characteristics
Founding anniversary	Various 	Banquet, dancing, singing
Mid-Autumn Festival banquet	Mid-Sept to Mid-Oct	Dancing, singing, eating home-made food
Lunar New Year banquet	Mid-Jan to Mid-Feb	Dancing, singing, eating home-made food, exchanging red-packets (gifts of cash)
Commemoration of the Founding of the Republic of China	Held annually on Oct 1	Banquet, speeches from senior Chinese officials
Funerals	Various 	Helping poor, single and elderly members to organise funerals, fund raising, giving money to bereaved families
Wedding banquets 	Various 	Playing hometown music, photo-taking, married couples and families give money to clan association as donations
Returning China to worship ancestors 	Usually during Qingming festival around March 	Meeting village leaders and old friends, worship ancestors, organising banquets 
Liaison with Mainland and overseas organizations	Various 	Reception of overseas and Mainland organisations and clan associations, arranging accommodation and sight-seeing, gift exchange
Credit rotation	Monthly 	Credit rotation becomes less popular, only few clan associations continue the practice. The purpose has changed from credit generation to sustaining financial needs of clan association 
Committee meeting 	Monthly 	Discussing issues not just about clan associations, but also their communities
(sources: Newsletters from various clan associations)




Photo 1: Buddha statues in a village-based clan association 

		            

(source: Newsletter of the Hong Kong Ku Yan Clan Association, No.1, December, 2001, p12)




Forms of social capital 
			Contextual variables

Trustworthiness	 


Networks		   TRUST		   Collective action


Institutions 






PAGE  



1



